Whereas boson coherent states with complex parametrization provide an elegant, and intuitive representation, there is no counterpart for fermions using complex parametrization. However, a complex parametrization provides a valuable way to describe amplitude and phase of a coherent beam. Thus we pose the question of whether a fermionic beam can be described, even approximately, by a complex-parametrized coherent state and define, in a natural way, approximate complex-parametrized fermion coherent states. Then we identify four appealing properties of boson coherent states (eigenstate (...) of annihilation operator, displaced vacuum state, preservation of product states under linear coupling, and factorization of correlators) and show that these approximate complex fermion coherent states fail all four criteria. The inapplicability of complex parametrization supports the use of Grassman algebras as an appropriate alternative. (shrink)

Whereas boson coherent states with complex parametrization provide an elegant, and intuitive representation, there is no counterpart for fermions using complex parametrization. However, a complex parametrization provides a valuable way to describe amplitude and phase of a coherent beam. Thus we pose the question of whether a fermionic beam can be described, even approximately, by a complex-parametrized coherent state and define, in a natural way, approximate complex-parametrized fermion coherent states. Then we identify four appealing properties of boson coherent states and (...) show that these approximate complex fermion coherent states fail all four criteria. The inapplicability of complex parametrization supports the use of Grassman algebras as an appropriate alternative. (shrink)

We rely on language to know the minds of others, but does language have a role to play in knowing our own minds? To suppose it does is to look for a connection between mastery of a language and the epistemic relation we bear to our inner lives. What could such a connection consist in? To explore this, I shall examine strategies for explaining self-knowledge in terms of the use we make of language to express and report our mental states. (...) Success in these strategies will depend on the view we take of speakers' understanding of the words they use to speak their minds. The key is to avoid circularity in the account of how they know what they mean; for if knowing what one is saying in speaking a language provides a means of knowing one's own mind, it cannot simply be a part of it. I shall look at ways in which we might proceed here, and examine whether the strategy can make room for a genuinely first-person point of view. But first let me try to motivate the problem of self-knowledge. (shrink)

EVERY speaker of a language knows a bewildering variety of linguistic facts, and will come to know many more. It is knowledge that connects sound and meaning. Questions about the nature of this knowledge cannot be separated from fundamental questions about the nature of language. The conception of language we should adopt depends on the part it plays in explaining our knowledge of language. This chapter explores options in accounting for language, and our knowledge of language, and defends the view (...) that individuals’ languages are constituted by the standing knowledge they carry from one speech situation to another. (shrink)

Long-standing neglect of the chemical senses in the philosophy of perception is due, mostly, to their being regarded as ‘lower’ senses. Smell, taste, and chemically irritated touch are thought to produce mere bodily sensations. However, empirically informed theories of perception can show how these senses lead to perception of objective properties, and why they cannot be treated as special cases of perception modelled on vision. The senses of taste, touch, and smell also combine to create unified perceptions of flavour. The (...) nature of these multimodal experiences and the character of our awareness of them puts pressure on the traditional idea that each episode of perception goes one or other of the five senses. Thus, the chemical senses, far from being peripheral to the concerns of the philosophy of perception, may hold important clues to the multisensory nature of perception in general. (shrink)

In his latest book, Michael Devitt rejects Chomsky’s mentalist conception of linguistics. The case against Chomsky is based on two principal claims. First, that we can separate the study of linguistic competence from the study of its outputs: only the latter belongs to linguistic inquiry. Second, Chomsky’s account of a speaker’s competence as consisiting in the mental representation of rules of a grammar for his language is mistaken. I shall argue, first, that Devitt fails to make a case for separating (...) the study of outputs from the study of competence, and second, that Devitt mis-characterises Chomsky’s account of competence, and so his objections miss their target. Chomsky’s own views come close to a denial that speaker’s have knowledge of their language. But a satisfactory account of what speakers are able to do will need to ascribe them linguistic knowledge that they use to speak and understand. I shall explore a conception of speaker’s knowledge of language that confirrns Chomsky’s mentalist view of linguistics but which is immune to Devitt’s criticism. (shrink)

Is the taste of a wine in our minds or in the glass? Can knowledge make a difference to the pleasure a wine gives us? Do the elaborate descriptions of wines in terms of fruits or spices, their "suppleness" or "brawniness," really mean anything? Questions of Taste is the first book to examine the philosophical issues surrounding our experience and enjoyment of wine. Featuring lucid essays from philosophers, a linguist, a biochemist, a wine producer and a wine critic, these leading (...) thinkers use their critical and analytical skills to address these controversial issues. (shrink)

Research suggests that metacognitive monitoring ability does not decline with age. For example, judgments-of-learning accuracy is roughly equivalent between younger and older adults. But few studies have asked whether younger and older adults’ metacognitive ability varies across different types of memory processes. The current study tested the relationship between memory and post-decision confidence ratings at the trial level on item and associative memory recognition tests. As predicted, younger and older adults had similarmetacognitive efficiency, when using meta-d’/d’, a measure derived from (...) Signal Detection Theory, despite a significant age effect favoring younger adults on memory performance. This result is consistent with previous work showing age-equivalent metacognitive efficiency in the memory domain. We also found that metacognitive efficiency was higher for associative memory than for item memory across age groups, even though associative and item recognition memory were statistically equivalent. Higher accuracy on post-test decision confidence ratings for associative recognition relative to item recognition on resolution accuracy itself and when corrected for performance differences are novel findings. Implications for associative metacognition are discussed. (shrink)

Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The contributors examine philosophical questions raised by the distinctive character of self-knowledge, relating it to knowledge of other minds, to rationality and agency, externalist (...) theories of psychological content, and knowledge of language. Together these original, stimulating, and closely interlinked essays demonstrate the special relevance of self-knowledge to a broad range of issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. (shrink)

Barry C. Smith; VI*—Understanding Language, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 109–142, https://doi.org/10.1093/ari.

The Cheng-Zhu 程朱 school of Confucianism congealed from the larger Learning of the Way school in the 11th and 12th centuries. In contrast to Buddhist conceptions of human nature, Cheng-Zhu advocates claimed an understanding that gave a significant role to the natural world. Addressing the ecology of the human organism in its relationship with the natural environment revealed a complex moral psychology that characterized human beings. Self-cultivation was indispensable for connecting to our inborn nature that revealed no separation between ourselves (...) and nature. Cultivating the mental state of maintaining reverence was an indispensable form of self-cultivation. This mental state initially expressed itself in courteous and caring behavior that could be taught to the young; but, when more highly developed, reverent attention was disciplined, focused thinking that revealed the mind of the Way. A new single-mindedness might then be maintained as the master of one’s actions. The morally perfected states of being called humaneness and sagehood confirmed that one was in touch with one’s inborn connection to nature. (shrink)

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 0967-2559 (print)/1466-4542 (online) Original Article.

A new realislic local model of light propagation and detection is described. The authors propose a novel stochastic model of low-intensity photon detection in which background noise is added to a part of the photon prior to absorption. In this model, in agreement with Planck, there is no quantization of the propagating field. The model has some similarities to theories advanced by E. Santos and T. Marshall in the last decade, but also has substantial deviations from these. A mechanism, conserving (...) energy and momentum, is proposed by which a sudden collapse of the wave-packet is avoided. The experimental Bell inequality violation of Aspect. Grangier and Roger [Phys. Rev. Lett.47, 460 (1981)]is discussed. The authors have carried out a computer simulation of a radio frequency (RF) analogue of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen thought experiment to illustrate how the manipulation of certain factors, especially signal to noise ratio, detector threshold and characteristics of the noise, enables the same Bell inequality to be either satisfied or violated by a realistic local model. Building on arguments by Santos. [Phys. Rev. A46. 3646 (1992)],the appropriateness of this Bell lest is discussed. Neither the authors' stochastic-optical model, nor their RF analogue, involves an enhancement assumption of the type defined by Clauser and Horne [Phys. Rev. D10, 526 (1974)]. (shrink)

Individuals are faced with the many opportunities to pirate. The decision to pirate or not may be related to an individual''s attitudes toward other ethical issues. A person''s ethical and moral predispositions and the judgments that they use to make decisions may be consistent across various ethical dilemmas and may indicate their likelihood to pirate software. This paper investigates the relationship between religion and a theoretical ethical decision making process that an individual uses when evaluating ethical or unethical situations. An (...) ethical decision making model was studied for general unethical scenarios and for the unethical behavior of software piracy. The research model was tested via path analysis using structural equation modeling and was found to be appropriate for the sample data. The results suggest that there is a relationship between religion and the stages of an ethical decision making process regarding general ethical situations and software piracy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Differences of evaluative judgments are often assumed to be a reason to prefer pluralism, relativism or subjectivism to objectivism, and this preference is even more pronounced in the case of judgements of taste. A comparison between perceptual and moral disagreements, however, enables us to understand that differences in judgments may be due to a difference in access to the situation or object, and not necessarily to a difference in value. The feeling of irresolvable differences that sometimes arises in situations (...) of evaluation, may not hold in the absence of objective values and / or common values, but be due to a difficulty or inability to capture the perspective, or circumstances of assessment wherein the other agents are placed. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.Empathie et perception des valeursVolume 51, Issue 1Barry C. Smith DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000261Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. Empathie et perception des valeursVolume 51, Issue 1Barry C. Smith DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000261Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. Empathie et perception des valeursVolume 51, Issue 1Barry C. Smith DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000261Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Right now my conscious experience is directed at part of the world. It takes in some aspects of things around me and not others. Some bits of the world occupy my attention, other worldly goings on condition or colour the character of my current perceptual experience. I experience buildings in view through the window, the clothes in the corner of the room, the colour of the walls, the plate with breads, the coffee mugs, the smell of fresh laundry, the muffled (...) sounds of someone in the kitchen, the sounds from the street: a sequence of things that in turn capture my attention moment to moment. And all the while thoughts occur to me, modulating my conscious awareness. I have no doubt that the world and my place in it, together with my recent past history, explains the particular form my consciousness takes right now. But what shape does that explanation take? Things out there beyond the boundaries of my skin enter into the conscious events I undergo. The inner is in this way shaped and determined by those outer things that impress themselves on the mind. What is it, though, for consciousness of this kind to go on at all? (shrink)

In uttering a sentence we are often take to assert more than its literal meaning - though sometimes we assert less. This phenomenon is taken by many to show that what is said or asserted by a speaker on an occasion is a contextually enriched or developed version of the semantic content of the words uttered. I argue that we can resist this conclusion by recognizing that what we think we are asserting, or take others to assert, involves selective attention (...) to just one of the ways a sentence could be true and neglects others. In most conversations people converge in their selective attention and communication is not impaired. Though in the case of sentences involving predicates of personal taste, people's attention to aspects of what is claimed differs and this can lead to intractable disputes. I offer a diagnosis of such disputes where speakers can disagree about the same claim and both be right. (shrink)

Disagreements about what is delicious, what is funny, what is morally acceptable can lead to intractable disputes between parties holding opposing views of a given subject. How should we think of such disputes? Do they always amount to genuine disagreements? The answer will depend on how we understand disagreement and how we should think about the meaning and truth of statements in these areas of discourse. I shall consider cases of dispute and disagreement where relativism about truth appears to give (...) the best explanation of the phenomena. I will argue that that we cannot explain the relativist option merely by relativizing truth to an extra parameter, such as a standard of taste, or a sense of humour. Instead, I will focus on cases where the dispute concerns whether either of the two opposing parties is judging in accordance with an existing standard, and I shall suggest that how we should think of these cases bears important affinities with rule-following considerations found in the later Wittgenstein’s work. (shrink)

Barry C. Smith: Quine and Chomsky on the Ins and Outs of Language: W.V.O. Quine's thinking has had a profound and lasting influence on the philosophy of language despite the fact that he remained firmly at odds with the science of linguistics for over thirty years. His rejection of the cognitive revolution ushered in by Noam Chomsky's work on language was rooted in a deeply held philosophical conviction that language was a publicly observable medium. However, Quine's advocacy of naturalized (...) epistemology should have inclined him to defer to advances in empirical linguistics due to generative grammar. Chomsky's review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior provided a devastating critique of behaviorism in the study of language and led to a subsequent mentalism about linguistic phenomena. But Quine did not revise his view about the proper way to study language, or his attendant view about the nature of language. His reasons for resisting Chomsky's position are worth reconsidering since they are in the background to many philosophers' views about the nature of language. The question addressed here is whether the dispute between Quine and Chomsky was a purely philosophical one, or whether it could have been resolved had greater attention been paid to the empirical facts. (shrink)

The new Chomskian orthodoxy denies that our linguistic competence gives us knowledge *of* a language, and that the representations in the language faculty are representations *of* anything. In reply, I have argued that through their intuitions speaker/hearers, (but not their language faculties) have knowledge of language, though not of any externally existing language. In order to count as knowledge, these intuitions must track linguistic facts represented in the language faculty. I defend this idea against the objections Collins has raised to (...) such an account. (shrink)

The critic Cyril Connolly once pointed out that diarists don’t make novelists. He went on to describe the problem for the would-be writer. “Writing for oneself: no public. Writing for others: no privacy” (Cyril Connolly, Journal). This paper addresses Connolly's worry about the public ad private: how can we reconcile the inner and conscious dimension of speech with its outer and public dimension? For if what people mean by their words involves, or consists in, what they have in mind when (...) they speak then how can what someone has in mind — the meaning she attaches to her words — be at the same time publicly accessible to others on the basis of her behaviour? The issue is whether there is a notion of the linguistic meaning of an expression that can do justice to both speakers’ inner experience of comprehension and to what is outwardly available in their public practice. (shrink)

Is relativism about truth ever a coherent doctrine? Some people have argued that an answer to this question depends on whether there can be cases of genuine disagreement where those who disagree hold conflicting beliefs towards the same proposition and yet are each entitled to say that what they believe is true. These have been called cases of faultless disagreement and are often explored by considering the case of disagreements about taste. However, this is not the right way to formulate (...) the relativist’s doctrine, and the discussions of taste are often based on a faulty view about the nature of taste and about the workings of predicates of taste. I examine the taste case in more detail and consider the prospects for a genuine form of truth relativism. (shrink)